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This article reviews several recent court cases at the federal and state levels related 
to school choice initiatives in the United States. Through this review, the article 
sheds light on the enduring question of whether these programs are unlawful bonds 
between church and state.  The review includes details about choice programs that 
exist (or have existed in the past) in the states where the cases originated: Ohio, 
Washington, Indiana, Arizona, and Colorado. Following this review, the article 
examines relevant, large-scale evaluations of choice programs and concludes with a 
discussion of the place of Catholic education in the school choice movement. 
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Introduction
Catholic school enrollment in the United States has dropped consid-erably over the last 50 years, causing many schools to close (Walch, 2003).  As a result, diocesan officials and Catholic school leaders have 
been compelled to create and implement innovative policies and practices—
i.e., tuition assistance programs, marketing plans, alternative governance and 
finance structures, fundraising, foundations, etc.—in order to remain a viable 
and impactful option within the U.S. education system (Goldschmidt & 
Walsh, 2011).  Not all of these programs have sustained the test of time; much 
of the ongoing struggle to survive occurs in inner-city Catholic schools serv-
ing mainly low-income students of color (DeFiore, Convey, & Schuttloffel, 
2009).  That such schools struggle most should come as no surprise, as tuition 
is typically the largest funding source for most Catholic schools and those in 
the inner-city have significantly discounted tuition rates compared to schools 
in wealthy neighborhoods (McDonald & Schultz, 2013), resulting in less an-
nual revenue.  
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It would be a mistake to assume that lowering tuition rates and provid-
ing families additional financial assistance will automatically solve inner-city 
Catholic schools’ enrollment problems.  Lowered tuition costs and additional 
financial assistance result in less revenue and smaller operating budgets, 
making it difficult for already under-resourced schools to provide a quality, 
well-rounded education.  In addition, the discounted tuition rates inner-
city Catholic schools offer to low-income families do not necessarily make 
Catholic schooling affordable for those families.  For example, if a family of 
four with two children and an annual household income of $40,000 were 
required to pay $4,000 per child per year in tuition costs to the local Catholic 
school, they would be paying the same percentage of their annual household 
income—20%—as a family of four with two children and an annual house-
hold income of $100,000 paying $10,000 per child per year in tuition costs—
a 150% increase from $4,000.  Much of the disparity lies in the amount of 
income left after tuition is paid; the former is left with $32,000 to support a 
family of four over the course of a year whereas the latter has $80,000, un-
doubtedly a far more feasible financial situation.   
Having exhausted many sustainability plans with varying degrees of suc-
cess, while taking into account the admirable, yet seemingly inconceivable 
financial sacrifices many families make to put their children through Catholic 
schools, some Catholic education leaders and advocates have turned their 
attention and efforts to the school choice movement, believing that state and 
citywide programs such as vouchers and tax credits offer ways to expunge the 
tuition variable from the Catholic school funding formula, making a Catho-
lic education accessible to all desiring families regardless of income level 
(Huchting & Cunningham, 2013).  Essentially, school choice programs offer 
students either public or private monies in the form of vouchers or scholar-
ships that can be used for tuition at private schools of their choice, including 
Catholic schools (Howell, Peterson, Wolf, & Campbell, 2006).  
The school choice movement gained considerable momentum in the 
1990s with the increased number of charter schools and voucher programs 
and then hit its stride during the second Bush administration and its 
implementation of No Child Left Behind (NCLB, 2001).  Since President 
Obama’s 2009 inauguration, many states have enacted new laws that allow 
parents access to public tax dollars for the funding of their children’s pri-
vate education.  As of 2014, 50 school choice programs exist in 23 states and 
Washington, DC; of the 50, there were 23 voucher programs, 17 tax credit 
scholarship programs, eight individual tax deduction programs, and one 
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education savings account program (Friedman Foundation for Educational 
Choice, 2014).  However, similar to most new educational policies, with 
popularity and growth comes controversy and debate.  
School choice has rapidly developed into one of the more contested and 
politicized issues around educational policy in the US (Ravitch, 2010; Stew-
art & Wolf, 2014).  As of 2012, 68.4% of all private K-12 schools in the US 
were religiously affiliated (Broughman & Swaim, 2013); therefore, droves of 
parents are either utilizing publicly funded vouchers to send their children 
to religious schools or making tax-creditable donations to organizations that 
offer scholarships to students attending religious schools.  As these state and 
citywide programs continue to increase in number, so too has the volume of 
litigation challenging their constitutionality (McCarthy, Cambron-McCabe, 
& Eckes, 2014) and questioning their adherence to the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion…” (U.S. Const. amend. I).  The 
following is a review of recent federal and state cases related to school choice, 
the purpose of which is to clarify the enduring question of whether these 
programs are unlawful bonds between church and state.  Included in the 
review are details regarding the different choice programs that exist in the 
states where the cases originated.  The article then segues into a summary 
of relevant, large-scale evaluations of choice programs and concludes with a 
discussion of Catholic education’s place in the school choice movement. 
United States Supreme Court Cases
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
Prior to 1995, the Cleveland City Ohio School District had an abysmal 
performance record (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).  As a result, the state 
of Ohio officially took control of the district and ultimately created and im-
plemented the controversial Pilot Project Scholarship Program (PPSP).  The 
PPSP provided publically funded tuition scholarships—usable at both private 
and public schools—for students who lived in the district and whose families 
lived below 200% of the poverty line.  The program also provided funding 
and resources for tutorial aid for students who remained in public schools. 
Even though both religious and nonreligious schools could participate in 
the PPSP, by the year 2000, “82% of the participating private schools had a 
religious affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools participated, and 96% 
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of the students participating in the scholarship portion of the program were 
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools” (p. 3).
Eventually, a group of Ohio taxpayers brought suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio in order to enjoin the PPSP on 
grounds that the program was in violation of the Establishment Clause (Zel-
man v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).  The District Court initially issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, then granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, 
which “permanently enjoined administration” of the PPSP (p. 3).  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s decision, stating that 
the PPSP “had the primary effect of advancing religion” (p. 3), thus violating 
the Establishment Clause.
After the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of enjoinment, the case was once 
again appealed and argued in front of the U.S. Supreme Court in February of 
2002; ultimately, it was reversed in June of 2002.  The Court decided that the 
PPSP was constitutional and not in violation of the First Amendment’s Es-
tablishment Clause.  Concurring Justices portrayed the program as “neutral in 
all aspects of religion” (p. 3) because it offered assistance to students based on 
financial need not religious affiliation; all school types within the district—
including private religious, private non-religious, community schools, and 
traditional public—were permitted to enroll scholarship recipients; and the 
scholarship funds were awarded to parents, not the schools themselves.  In 
other words, parents were left solely responsible for private religious schools’ 
receipt of public funds, a freedom of choice the Court was willing to ensure.
Since Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), school choice programs in Ohio 
have expanded. Currently, Ohio has five choice programs: (a) the Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program, formerly referred to as PPSP, (b) the 
Educational Choice Scholarship Program, (c) the Autism Scholarship Pro-
gram, (d) the Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program, and (e) the 
Income-Based Scholarship Program (Friedman Foundation for Educational 
Choice, 2014).  The district-wide Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Pro-
gram (formerly known as PPSP) was explained during the Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris (2002) summary.
The details of the second Ohio choice program, the Educational Choice 
Scholarship Program, are similar to those of the Cleveland Scholarship and 
Tutoring Program—private school scholarships are provided to students who 
attend and wish to leave low-performing public schools.  However, this state-
wide program is not confined to a single district.  The Autism Scholarship 
Program and the Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program both pro-
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vide public funding in the form of supplemental educational services and pri-
vate school tuition for students with special needs.  The Autism Scholarship 
Program limits its eligibility to students diagnosed with an autism spectrum 
disorder and currently enrolled in the public school system, whereas the Jon 
Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program is open to students with vary-
ing disabilities.  The recently launched Income-Based Scholarship Program 
provides vouchers for private school tuition to kindergarteners from families 
with household incomes that do not exceed 300% of the federal poverty level. 
Each subsequent year of the program will include the next highest grade 
until all grades, kindergarten through 12th, are eligible (Friedman Foundation 
for Educational Choice, 2014).
Locke v. Davey 
Currently, the state of Washington does not have any K-12 school choice 
programs.  However, a case regarding higher education funding, the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—“Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof” (U.S. Const. amend. I)—and state funding of religious 
education surfaced over a decade ago and has since significantly influenced 
court decisions of school choice cases.  
The state of Washington established the Promise Scholarship Program 
to assist high achieving students from low-income families with the cost of 
college education (Locke v. Davey, 2004).  To qualify for a Promise Scholar-
ship, students had to graduate in the top 15% of their high school class, earn 
either a 1,200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I (SAT) or a 27 or 
better on the American College Test (ACT), and the student’s family income 
had to be “less than 135 percent of the State’s median” (p. 1).  Although, due 
to a certain provision in Washington’s state constitution, not all otherwise-
qualified students were eligible to receive a Promise Scholarship.  This provi-
sion states that no public money or property shall be used for any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction (Locke v. Davey, 2004).  
While the Promise program allowed students to use the scholarship to 
attend accredited religious educational institutions and enroll in religious 
classes, the program did not permit students to use the scholarship to pur-
sue a degree in devotional theology.  This became an issue when a Promise 
Scholarship recipient who “wished to pursue a degree in pastoral ministries 
at a private, church-affiliated college” (p. 2) was required to sign a form stat-
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ing he was not pursuing a theological degree.  He refused, did not receive any 
scholarship funds, claimed that his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment were being violated, and brought suit in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington “to enjoin the state from 
refusing to award the scholarship…solely because the student was pursuing a 
devotional-theology degree” (p. 2).  In the case of Locke v. Davey (2004), the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the state.
The case was appealed in the Ninth Circuit and reversed; “the denial of 
a scholarship to a student solely because the student decided to pursue a 
degree in theology from a religious perspective infringed the student’s right 
to the free exercise of religion under the Federal Constitution’s First Amend-
ment…” (p. 2).  The Ninth Circuit’s decision was based on two main points: 
(a) the state of Washington subjected religion to adverse treatment and (b) 
the state failed to effectively portray its concerns pertaining to government 
funds being used toward the establishment of religion. 
In December of 2003, Locke v. Davey (2004) was argued before the U.S. 
Supreme Court and in February of 2004, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was re-
versed.  The provision was found not in violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
because it does not suggest animosity or discrimination toward religion, 
does not single out religion for unfavorable treatment, imposes no penalties 
on religion, and does not force any student to choose between religion and 
the receipt of government benefits.  The Court determined that the state of 
Washington has a substantial interest against the establishment of religion by 
way of funding religious degrees, thus there exists a rational basis for the law.  
Additionally, the denial of funding for religious degrees places a “relatively 
minor burden” on the scholarship recipients (p. 1).
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn et al. 
Arizona’s school choice programs were built mostly on individuals and 
corporations’ yearly donations to School Tuition Organizations (STO); any 
person or corporation that makes a donation to an STO receives a dollar-
for-dollar tax credit (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).  
STOs are non-profit organizations “that provide private school scholarships”, 
including religious schools, to qualifying students (Friedman Foundation for 
Educational Choice, 2013, p. 7).  In addition, some families have the opportu-
nity to withdraw their portion of public funding and use it for their children’s 
education as they see fit.  
191School Choice
Arizona has five school choice programs: (a) the Original Individual 
Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, (b) the Low-Income Corporate 
Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, (c) Lexie’s Law for Disabled and 
Displaced Students Tax Credit Scholarship Program, (d) the Empower-
ment Scholarship Accounts (ESA) program, and (e) the Switcher Individual 
Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program (Friedman Foundation for Edu-
cational Choice, 2014).  As referenced above, the first two programs allow 
people and corporations to make tax creditable donations to STOs that are 
earmarked for private school scholarships to qualifying students.  Each STO 
within the personal tax credit program sets its own student eligibility guide-
lines; whereas, the corporate tax credit program STOs limit their eligibility 
requirements to students from families with household incomes that are 185% 
below the reduced-price lunch guidelines (Friedman Foundation for Educa-
tional Choice, 2013).
The third and fourth tax credit programs in Arizona are slightly more 
specialized (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013).  Similar to 
the corporate tax credit program, the Lexie’s Law program allows corpora-
tions to donate to STOs; however, these STOs must specialize in offering 
private school scholarships to students with disabilities and those students in 
foster care.  The ESA program “allows parents of children with disabilities to 
withdraw their children from district or charter schools and receive a portion 
of their public funding deposited into an account with defined, but multiple, 
uses…” (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013, p. 13).  These 
uses can include “private school tuition, online education, private tutoring, or 
future college expenses” (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013, 
p. 13).  The Switcher program is a supplement to the Original program; if, and 
only if, an individual reaches her maximum credit amount in the latter ($528) 
then she can obtain an additional dollar-for-dollar credit by donating up to 
$525 to the former (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).
In 2010, a group of taxpayers in Arizona brought suit against the State 
Department of Revenue, challenging the Arizona law that provides individu-
als “tax credits for contributions” to STOs (Arizona Christian STO v. Winn, 
2011, p. 1).  The plaintiffs originally filed suit in U.S District Court, “claiming 
that the law is unconstitutional because it impermissibly subsidizes religious 
schools” (Legal Clips, 2011) and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.  
During the first year of this program, 94% of the donated funds went to 
STOs that limit their scholarships to students attending religious schools 
(Arizona Christian STO v. Winn, 2011).
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The district court dismissed the suit due to the plaintiffs’ failure to state a 
valid claim.  However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court’s decision stating that the plaintiffs did, in fact, have legal standing 
to bring the suit.  After reviewing the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
law had no valid secular purpose, despite any legislative history that revealed 
otherwise (Arizona Christian STO v. Winn, 2011).
The case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court where, in a five to 
four vote, the Ninth Circuit decision was reversed (Arizona Christian STO 
v. Winn, 2011).  The Court decided that the respondents lacked standing to 
bring the suit under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because taxpayers, 
in general, lack standing to object to government expenditures they believe 
to be unconstitutional and the two exceptions to this rule, set forth in Flast 
v. Cohen (1968), were not met; there was neither a “logical link” between 
taxpayer status “and the type of legislative enactment attacked” nor “a nexus” 
between taxpayer status and “the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged” (p. 102).  The majority reiterated that the plaintiffs’ tax dollars 
were not being used in direct support of religious education and the STO tax 
credit is not a religious tax or tithe.  Instead, people choosing to donate to 
STOs that provide scholarships to students who attend religious schools are 
doing so on their own accord with their own money (Arizona Christian STO 
v. Winn, 2011).
Cases in Lower Courts
Meredith v. Daniels 
Similar to most other state voucher programs, Indiana’s version of the 
Choice Scholarship Program (CSP) provides vouchers “worth up to 90% 
of the state per-student spending amount for the sending school district” 
(Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013, p. 31) to students from 
low- and middle-income families.  Eligible students must come from families 
earning up to 150% of the federal free and reduced-price lunch program and 
the vouchers are to be used for private school tuition (Friedman Foundation 
for Educational Choice, 2013).
In late 2011, a group of Indiana taxpayers brought suit in the Marion 
County Superior Court against the state of Indiana and its implementation 
of the CSP, alleging that the program violates Article 8, Section 1; Article 
1, Section 4; and Article 1 Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution.  Article 
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8, Section 1 provides that it is the duty of the general assembly to encour-
age education “by all means possible,” and to require “a general and uniform 
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge and 
equally available to all” (Meredith v. Daniels, 2012, p. 3).  Article 1, Section 4 
states, “No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or 
mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or sup-
port, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent” 
(p. 5).  Article 1, Section 6 states, “no money shall be drawn from the treasury, 
for the benefit of any religious or theological institution” (p. 7).  The plaintiffs 
also argued that the religious schools participating in the CSP had a collec-
tive degree of religiosity—“the extent to which religion is pervasive” (p. 2)—
that demonstrated unconstitutionality.    
In the case of Meredith v. Daniels (2012), the plaintiffs’ motion for a pre-
liminary injunction was denied and the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the state.  The court found the CSP not in violation of Article 8, Sec-
tion 1 because “the ‘all suitable means’ clause authorizes educational option 
outside of the public school system” (p. 5).  According to the court, Article 
1, Section 4 does not prohibit the state from providing public tax dollars 
to private citizens in order to make personal, independent choices regard-
ing their children’s places of education, even if they choose private, religious 
schools; therefore, the CSP was found not in violation of Article 1, Section 4.  
The court found the CSP not in violation of Article 1, Section 6 because the 
program was not created specifically to benefit religious schools, but rather 
to provide parents the right to choose where their children attend school, 
whether it be at public, private religious, or private non-religious schools.  
Lastly, the court found the plaintiffs’ claim regarding CSP schools’ degree 
of religiosity to be “immaterial” (p. 2).  After the Marion County Superior 
Court ruled in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs brought the case to the 
Indiana Supreme Court where the trial court’s decision was affirmed (Mer-
edith v. Daniels, 2013). 
Besides the CSP, Indiana currently has two other school choice pro-
grams—the School Scholarship Tax Credit, and the Private School/Home-
school Deduction (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).  The 
School Scholarship Tax Credit program allows individuals and corporations 
to make tax-deductible donations (50% tax credit) to Scholarship Granting 
Organizations (SGO).  SGOs are similar to Arizona’s STOs; they are non-
profit organizations that provide scholarships in the form of private school 
tuition for students who live at or below 200% of the free and reduced-price 
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lunch income guideline.  The Private School/Homeschool Deduction pro-
gram allows parents to make tax deductions up to $1,000 per child for ex-
penses such as private school tuition, textbooks, fees, software, tutoring, and 
supplies (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).
Niehaus v. Huppenthal 
In Niehaus v. Huppenthal (2013), the plaintiff, Sharon Niehaus, first 
brought suit in the Maricopa County Superior Court against the defendant, 
John Huppenthal, the Arizona State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
and his capacity to implement Arizona’s ESA program (Niehaus v. Hup-
penthal, 2013).  Niehaus claimed that the ESA program violated the Religion 
and Aid clauses of the Arizona Constitution.  The Religion clause—Article 
II, Section 12—states that “no public money…shall be appropriated for or 
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of 
any religious establishment” (p. 7).  The Aid clause—Article IX, Section 10—
states that “no tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid 
of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corpora-
tion” (p. 11).
In January of 2012, the Superior Court denied the plaintiff ’s motion and 
ruled in favor of the defendant, declaring Arizona’s ESA program not in 
violation of the Religion and Aid clauses of the state constitution (Niehaus 
v. Huppenthal, 2013).  The court held that scholarships from ESAs approxi-
mately equivalent to the annual per-pupil cost of a public education provide 
parents the opportunity to choose the appropriate educational experiences 
for their children and the public funds do not directly support any religious 
establishment, church, and/or school.  A year later in October of 2013, the 
case was appealed and the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the Superior 
Court’s decision along with refuting the plaintiff ’s additional claim that the 
ESA “unconstitutionally conditions receipt of a government benefit on the 
waiver of a constitutional right because it requires that the parent of a quali-
fied student promise not to enroll the student in public school” (p. 16).
Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas County School District 
In 2011, the Douglas County School District (DCSD) in Colorado 
established their version of the Choice Scholarship Program (CSP).  The 
Douglas County CSP—Colorado’s only school choice program—provides 
vouchers for private school tuition to DCSD students who have lived and 
attended public school in the district for at least one year.  Students may use 
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the vouchers at any private school, secular or religious, with the exception 
of online schools and home schooling (Friedman Foundation for Educa-
tion Choice, 2013).  Not long after the CSP was first implemented, plaintiffs 
including students, parents, taxpayers, and non-profit organizations filed suit 
in district court claiming that the CSP violated Colorado’s Public School Fi-
nance Act of 1994 (PSFA) and numerous state constitutional provisions.  The 
District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Taxpayers v. DCSD, 2013).
Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas County School District (2013) was 
brought to the Colorado Court of Appeals and, regarding the CSP’s viola-
tion of PSFA, the district court’s decision was reversed, concluding that the 
plaintiffs did not “have standing to seek redress for the claimed violation by 
the CSP of the PSFA…” (Legal Clips, 2013).  Due to the complexity of this 
case, the appellate court’s analyses of the CSP’s constitutionality pertaining 
to each of the seven state provisions in question are discussed below along 
with the court’s conclusion.
Article IX, Section 2: Thorough and Uniform System of Free Public 
Schools.  According to the court, the CSP is “entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality” (Taxpayers v. DCSD, 2013, p. 21).  The plaintiffs argued “that 
because students participating in the CSP may not receive a free education 
(because parents must pay the difference remaining after remittance of the 
scholarships, the CSP necessarily violates Article IX, Section 2” (p. 21).  The 
court disagreed and stated that the plaintiffs misunderstood the provision; “it 
requires that a thorough and uniform system of free elementary through high 
school education be made available to students” (p. 25) and a school district is 
not in violation of the mandate if it chooses to offer alternative educational 
choices “in addition to the free system the constitution requires” (pp. 25-26).  
Moreover, participating private schools are not automatically transformed 
into public schools “subject to the uniformity requirement” (p. 27) simply 
because they receive funds through the district.  Therefore, the court decided 
that the plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the CSP 
violates Article IX, Section 2. 
Article IX, Section 3: Use of the Public School Funds.  This provision 
applies to the required state distributions of monies from the Public School 
Fund to school districts. Once the state makes the distribution from the 
Public School Fund, those monies belong to the district.  In addition, only a 
small portion (2%) of a district’s money comes from the Public School Fund.  
Based upon the presumption of constitutionality, the court assumed that the 
CSP is funded by the remaining 98% (to which Article IX, Section 3 cannot 
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apply, as the funds do not stem from the Public School Fund).  Therefore, the 
court decided the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof and the CSP 
was not in violation of Article IX, Section 3.
Article IX, Section 15: Local Control.  This provision “is aimed at ensur-
ing the state does not encroach upon the prerogative of local school districts 
to control the instruction in the public schools within their districts” (p. 34). 
Because participating private schools “retain their character as private, not 
public”—as stated in the Article IX Section 2 ruling—“the provision does 
not relate to instruction in private schools” and therefore Article IX, Section 
15 does not apply to the CSP” (p. 34).
Article II, Section 4: Required Attendance or Support.  This provi-
sion is aimed at upholding constitutional neutrality and preventing a state-
supported establishment of religion. The court decided that the CSP was 
designed to support and benefit students, not schools, and all district students 
and any private schools had the choice to participate, which met the “neutral 
eligibility criteria” (p. 39).  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a court is 
in violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution if it inquires 
“into the extent to which religious teaching pervades a particular institution’s 
curriculum” (p. 41).  The state must remain neutral and objective if it chooses 
to utilize a set of criteria for purposes of evaluation.  The court thought this 
principle applied “with equal force where the program at issue is facially neu-
tral toward private religious schools because it is open to all private schools” 
(p. 44).  According to the court, the CSP “is neutral toward religion gener-
ally and toward religiously affiliated schools specifically” (p. 45); it neither 
promotes a religious cause nor supports religious institutions; and, it does 
not favor any one religion or denomination over and above all others.  Fur-
thermore, to the extent students may attend CSP schools that require par-
ticipation in religious services, “they would do so only as a result of parents’ 
voluntary choices” (p. 47) and not as a result of CSP compulsion. Therefore, 
the court ruled it not in violation of this article. 
Article IX, Section 7: No Aid to Religious Organizations.  According 
to the court, the CSP “is intended to benefit students and their parents, and 
any benefit to the participating schools is incidental” (p. 49).  The CSP was 
found to be neutral toward religion because parents make the autonomous 
choice to use the funds at religiously affiliated private schools. For “essentially 
the same reasons” the court “concluded that the CSP does not violate Article 
II, Section 4”, it also concluded “that it does not violate Article IX, Section 7” 
(p. 48).
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Article IX, Section 8: Religion in Public Schools.  The court ruled that 
this article does not apply.  In the decision, the court made the link between 
parents having the autonomous choice to enroll their children in participat-
ing, religiously affiliated private schools—that it is not required—and partici-
pating private schools retaining their status and not automatically transform-
ing into public schools.
Article V, Section 34: Prohibited Appropriations.  As interpreted by the 
court, no disbursements of state funds “would occur under the CSP” (p. 56).  
“The General Assembly appropriates” money for students’ education to the 
Colorado Department of Education; at that point, it is distributed to the “lo-
cal school districts in the form of total per-pupil revenue” (p. 56).  The school 
districts then take legal ownership of the funds and can use them as they see 
fit.  In the courts opinion, this should not be considered an “appropriation by 
the General Assembly” (p. 56).  Again, if any benefit befalls the participating 
private schools, it does so as a result of parents’ individual choices.  Therefore, 
the CSP was found not in violation of this provision.
In summary, the Colorado appellate court found the CSP not in violation 
of any “constitutional provisions raised by the plaintiffs” (Legal Clips, 2013).
All aforementioned cases—with the exception of Locke v. Davey (2004), 
which pertained to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, not 
the Establishment Clause—concluded in favor of state, city, and district-wide 
school choice programs, including vouchers and tax-deductible donations to 
STOs that subsidize tuition to schools with religious affiliations.  Three very 
important conclusions related to the persisting skepticism surrounding school 
choice programs and their connection to the Establishment Clause can be 
made from these court decisions.  First, the courts ruled the various school 
choice programs constitutional because the funds (i.e., vouchers) were ini-
tially dispersed not directly to the schools but to parents, providing them the 
autonomous choice as to where to enroll their children in school—whether it 
be public, private secular, or private religious—so long as the school is eligible 
for receipt and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin.  Second, people who choose to make tax-deductible donations to 
STOs (or, in Indiana, SGOs) that fund scholarships to religious schools are 
doing so on their own accord, with their own money, and therefore not caus-
ing direct harm to fellow taxpayers not in receipt of said scholarships.  And 
third, neither vouchers nor STO scholarships that fund tuition to private, 
religiously affiliated schools should be considered unlawful amalgamations of 
church and state.
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School choice programs appear to have passed the constitutionality test 
at both the federal and state levels.  Advocates plan to maintain and improve 
the existing programs while promoting legislation that would enact new pro-
grams in states that have yet to venture into the realm of school choice out-
side of the charter school movement.  As school choice continues to spread 
across the US, it is vital for consumers (such as parents) to remain abreast of 
the impact these programs and their participating schools have on students’ 
educational experiences.  The following is a brief discussion of a few of the 
larger school choice evaluation studies.
The Efficacy of School Choice Programs
Approximately 15 years ago, around the initial implementation of NCLB 
(2001), Howell, Peterson, Wolf, & Campbell (2006) evaluated three citywide, 
privately funded voucher programs located in New York City, Dayton, Ohio, 
and Washington, DC over a three-year span.  Utilizing random field trials—
a research design that utilizes random assignment to place participants into 
either a treatment or control group—and numerous indices, Howell and 
colleagues compared voucher students in private schools (treatment group) 
to their demographically similar, qualifying counterparts who chose to stay in 
public schools (control group).  Baseline student selection data showed negli-
gible demographic differences between the treatment and control groups—a 
necessary criterion for ensuring internal validity—and the voucher programs 
did not partake in “significant skimming” (Howell et al., 2006, p. 88), which 
is the practice of recruiting, selecting, and retaining only the seemingly most 
talented and committed students.
Private schools that participated in these three programs and enrolled 
voucher students had similar class sizes to their neighboring public schools.  
Even though most private schools operate with much smaller budgets, there 
were a few instances when private schools had smaller class sizes than neigh-
boring public schools.  Private schools in the studies were perceived empha-
sizing “school-parent communication, homework, and orderly classrooms” 
(Howell et al., 2006, p. 113), and helped “reduce racial isolation” (p. 138).  
Voucher students in these programs demonstrated higher levels of self-confi-
dence than their public school counterparts and voucher parents were much 
more satisfied with their children’s schools than eligible parents who decided 
to keep their children in public schools.  There were no significant differences 
in achievement test data between the treatment and control groups, with one 
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exception.  Over the course of the three-year evaluation study, African Amer-
ican voucher students outperformed their African American counterparts 
who remained in public schools (Howell et al., 2006).      
The state of Wisconsin currently has four school choice programs: (a) the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, (b) the Parental Private School Choice 
Program in Racine, Wisconsin, (c) the statewide Parental Choice Program, 
and (d) the K-12 Private School Tuition Deduction program (Friedman 
Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).  Witte, Carlson, Cowen, Fleming, 
and Wolf (2012) conducted a longitudinal, five-year evaluation of the Mil-
waukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP)—a voucher program for Mil-
waukee residents with a household income that does not exceed 300% of the 
federal poverty level (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2014).  
MPCP students’ math and reading achievement data in grades three through 
eight and grade 10 were compared to those of “carefully matched” Milwaukee 
Public Schools (MPS) students (Witte et al., 2012, p. ii).  
Findings showed no significant differences in achievement growth be-
tween MPCP and MPS students over the course of the first four years of the 
study.  However, when fifth-year test scores—the 2010-2011 school year—
were included in the longitudinal analysis, the five-year achievement growth 
data revealed significant differences favoring the MPCP students.  Witte et 
al. (2012) explained that differences in favor of MPCP students could have 
been a result of the implementation of a new policy during the fifth year of 
the evaluation.  Beginning in the 2010-2011 school year, for the first time, all 
MPCP students were required to take the same end-of-year standardized 
tests—the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts Examinations in math and 
reading—as MPS students (Witte et al, 2012).
Florida currently has two school choice programs: (a) the John M. McKay 
Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program and (b) the Florida Tax 
Credit Scholarship Program (FTCSP; Friedman Foundation for Educational 
Choice, 2014).  The FTCSP—one of the largest school choice programs in 
the US.—“provides a tax credit on corporate income taxes for donations to 
scholar-funding organizations, which use the funding to provide K-12 private 
school scholarships to low-income students” (Forster & D’Andrea, 2009, p. 
4).  There were two different evaluations of this program.  The first attempted 
to measure parental satisfaction via 808 phone interviews of parents of schol-
arship recipients (Forster & D’Andrea, 2009).  The second, which was a line 
of seven separate annual evaluations, sought to confirm ongoing state testing 
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and reporting compliance, describe scholarship recipients’ attributes, and as-
sess their academic performance and progress (Figlio, 2014).
Findings from the parent phone interviews determined that, when 
asked about their children’s new schools and educational experiences, the 
overwhelming majority of parents of scholarship recipients—62% to 80% 
(M=74.8) depending on the question—reported being “very satisfied” (Forster 
& D’Andrea, 2009, p. 1) with academic progress, the amount of individual 
attention at school and in class from teachers and administrators, teacher 
quality, “responsiveness” (p. 1) to children’s needs, and overall student behav-
ior.  The latest results in Figlio’s (2014) line of annual evaluations showed that 
compliance levels were high throughout the program, participants tended to 
come from “less advantaged families” and “lower-performing public schools” 
and “tend to be among the lowest-performing students in their prior school” 
(p. 1), and there were no identifiable differences in the cohort of low-income 
FTCSP students’ test data when compared to those of a national sample of 
students of all socioeconomic backgrounds.
These three evaluation studies—hardly an exhaustive list—addressed, 
among others, three looming concerns regarding choice programs.  First, 
adding voucher and tax credit programs to cities and states does not further 
segregate local public and private schools.  In fact, according to Howell et al. 
(2006), at times, these programs actually promote racial integration by some-
what negating the segregated housing variable.  Second, participating private 
schools were not skimming.  Howell et al. (2006) found among the baseline 
data inconsequential differences in demographics and academic achievement 
between treatment and control groups and Figlio (2014) reported FTCSP 
participants as being some of the lowest performing students from vastly 
underperforming local public schools.  Regarding the third concern, student 
achievement, these choice programs were far from panaceas.  There is not 
enough evidence in the data to make a claim that choice programs are bet-
ter academic options for students.  This can be interpreted one of two ways: 
(a) choice programs failed in their attempt to improve student achievement 
because they fared no better than neighboring public schools, or (b) choice 
schools are at least performing on par with their public counterparts so par-
ents should be awarded the right to choose an alternative education for their 
children because the funds would be put to good use and not wasted.  These 




The purpose of this article was to use a portion of the available infor-
mation on the constitutionality and efficacy of school choice programs to 
reiterate an opportunity for Catholic educators and advocates to curb the 
nationwide enrollment decline faced by Catholic schools and dioceses.  It has 
long been the mission of Catholic educators to serve the poor and marginal-
ized (Massaro, 2008; Scanlan, 2009) and, unfortunately, due to tuition costs, 
many Catholic K-12 schools have priced themselves out of fulfillment of this 
mission.  As Catholic education leaders continue to brainstorm methods of 
addressing the enrollment decline and marketing to inner-city families, it 
may behoove them to consider stronger advocacy for school choice in their 
cities and states, especially those still without school choice programs.  A 
lesson can be learned from the residents of Cleveland, Ohio in the mid 
1990s.  Parents fed up with what they believed to be incompetent local public 
schools turned to advocacy for a voucher program that would make private 
schools more affordable and ultimately an option for their children.  The 
result was the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, which has been 
in existence for almost 20 years, has served nearly 90,000 students, and was 
the subject of the famous Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) case—the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s first major decision related to school choice.  
With that said, critics of school choice are correct in their skepticism to-
ward voucher and tax credit programs.  By no means have all questions been 
answered and the investigation of their impact on students, families, and the 
public school system in the US should undoubtedly continue.  However, ac-
cording to the myriad of information that currently exists on school choice—
i.e., legal history and evaluation research—it would be worth the attempt to 
continue finding ways to improve students’ educational experiences. 
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